Pool demand, check the full price

We each buy separately. Could we get a different price together?

We compare prices, look for special offers and switch shops. But we usually approach the seller individually. And producers do not always know in advance how much of their product buyers will actually need.

Between these two sides lie procurement, transport, storage, sorting and retail. This work involves necessary costs.

But there is also a question buyers rarely receive a clear answer to:

what would the same product cost if the whole chain were coordinated in advance?

This question is particularly relevant in Israel. The OECD links the country's high cost of living, among other factors, to trade barriers, bureaucracy and insufficient competitive pressure.

ObliNet proposes testing a different way of working together:

buyers specify their demand → suppliers offer terms for that volume → carriers and collection points join the shared agreement.

This makes it clear:

• who provides what;
• when;
• for what fee;
• how the result is accepted.

This is not a promise that every purchase will become cheaper. A joint order may be inconvenient, and delivery may be too expensive.

That is why we need a calculation and an actual delivery, rather than promises.

We propose forming groups to run these tests:

one recurring set of products → one area → several independent offers → openly reported results.

It would be possible to see:

• how much people paid;
• how much producers received;
• how much organising the entire chain cost.

If you are willing to buy particular products regularly, tell us which products, in what quantities and where collection would be convenient for you. Specific demand could be the starting point for a different supply chain.

Source: OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2025

Between farmer and buyer: could both be better off?

A low farm-gate price and a high shelf price can coexist.

The gap alone does not reveal intermediaries' profits: the goods must be selected, transported, stored and sold.

But it gives us reason to ask:

could this work be organised at lower cost?

Israel's Ministry of Agriculture has described unequal bargaining power between farmers and market intermediaries: a lack of information about market prices and the need to sell perishable crops quickly weaken producers' position.

Demand agreed in advance could change the situation.

The farmer knows in advance:

• the volume;
• the quality requirements;
• the acceptance deadline;
• the payment arrangements.

Buyers know:

• what they will receive;
• what the product's entire journey to the collection point will cost.

Could there be an arrangement in which the farmer receives more and the household pays less?

Yes, if reductions in costs and mark-ups cover both differences.

For now, however, this is a hypothesis to test, not an ObliNet result.

Consider a purely hypothetical calculation.

The farmer previously received:

3 ₪ per kilogram.

The buyer paid: 12 ₪.

In an alternative chain, the farmer receives: 4 ₪.

Delivery, losses, sorting, collection and coordination together cost another: 4 ₪.

Total:

8 ₪ per kilogram.

The buyer pays about a third less.

The farmer receives about a third more.

All these figures are illustrative. They must be replaced with actual offers and actual costs.

We invite producers and buyer groups to test such a chain with a single batch. We will compare the same product, quality and period, including actual losses.

Source: משרד החקלאות — סחר הוגן — The reference to the Ministry of Agriculture concerns its published description of the problem, not a statement about current regulations.

A new supplier starts with buyers willing to reach an agreement

An entrepreneur may see a high price and know how to operate more cheaply.

But between the idea and an operating business, the central question remains:

who will actually buy the output?

If ObliNet makes it possible to bring together confirmed demand, a potential supplier will have a basis for calculation.

Not just:

“I would be interested in buying more cheaply.”

But specific information:

• the number of orders;
• requirements;
• the collection location;
• deadlines;
• an acceptable price.

It is important to distinguish interest from a commitment.

“I would buy it” is not yet a basis for renting a warehouse or purchasing equipment.

Before launch, the parties must agree on:

• the minimum volume;
• the final price;
• cancellation terms;
• each party's responsibilities.

This could lead to:

• a new delivery route;
• a collection point;
• a service team;
• cooperation in production.

Through the same network, a participant would be able to look for materials, spare capacity and partners.

There is an economic rationale for this idea: reducing uncertainty about demand may make it easier for new businesses to enter the market and invest.

But confirmed orders do not replace funding, expertise or the necessary permits.

That is why we propose starting at a manageable scale.

An independent supplier gets the opportunity to fulfil a small batch, demonstrate the result and then compete for further orders.

Buyers get the opportunity to compare actual alternatives rather than advertising promises.

If you can offer a more cost-effective way to produce, deliver or provide a service, describe the order volume needed to launch it. Let us test whether that demand can be brought together.

You can start with people, premises and an agreed schedule

A discussion about automatically sorting orders can easily turn into a discussion about expensive equipment.

A circular problem arises:

equipment requires volume, while volume requires a functioning network.

The first test can be organised more simply.

The producer delivers an agreed batch.

The team:

1. receives the goods;
2. checks quantity and quality;
3. sorts the orders into labelled spaces.

Buyers arrive at the agreed time.

In this model, ObliNet is intended to help link commitments:

• who will deliver the goods;
• who will receive them;
• who will assemble the orders;
• who will hand them out;
• what happens if quantities are short;
• what happens if there is a delay.

The full group purchasing system still requires development and testing.

Manual work also has a cost.

The calculation must include:

• labour costs;
• training;
• rent;
• consumables;
• errors;
• corrections.

Any work done voluntarily should be shown separately.

Otherwise, a low price may turn out to depend on a hidden burden of unpaid work.

Automation becomes a subsequent decision once actual volumes and operating costs are known.

It may be cost-effective to automate record-keeping while keeping order assembly manual.

Equipment may be needed only for particular products.

There is no universal answer known in advance.

A first trial does not require a national network.

It requires participants willing to complete one full cycle and show the economics of it.

Do you have suitable premises, logistics experience or the ability to organise collection? Suggest terms for a small pilot. Let us start with a process that can be tested and repeated.

Price transparency should enable choice

It is useful to see that a price is high.

Receiving a feasible alternative offer matters far more.

If a buyer knows delivery is expensive but cannot change carrier, that information alone makes little difference to their costs.

But if another carrier appears with suitable:

• timing;
• capacity;
• responsibility;
• and price,

there is a real choice.

ObliNet is being developed around this connection:

need → offer → agreed commitments → verified result.

In future, it may be possible to compare not only individual products but alternative arrangements for an entire chain.

Such a comparison must include the full price.

A cheap supply arrangement with:

• inconvenient collection;
• substantial losses;
• no arrangements for defective goods;
• unreliable timing

may ultimately prove expensive for the buyer.

But transparency has another important aspect.

Openness does not mean publishing personal orders and all commercial negotiations.

Buyers need clear terms on which to base their choices.

New participants need the opportunity to offer their services.

Data should be disclosed with its owners' consent and only to the extent needed for the interaction.

This also matters for competition: excessive transparency among a small number of sellers can sometimes make it easier to maintain high prices.

That is why independent offers and opportunities for new participants matter more than a shared price board alone.

We propose that pilot participants agree in advance which final indicators will be published: full price, quality, costs, failures and repeat orders. We will assess the work actually completed.

The same requirements should apply to the ObliNet operator:

• a clear fee;
• clear participation terms;
• the ability to export one's own data.

Source: OECD — Information Sharing in Competition Policy (2026)

Let us test ObliNet with our usual shopping basket

A discussion of high prices can end in yet another argument.

We propose turning it into a concrete experiment.

A pilot could involve an existing buyer group or a new voluntary group.

Let us choose a small set of regularly needed products.

Let us specify:

• quality;
• quantity;
• a convenient collection location.

Let us request independent offers from:

• producers;
• suppliers;
• delivery organisers.

Then we will calculate the whole chain and fulfil the order.

The price will include:

• the goods;
• transport;
• losses;
• order assembly;
• collection;
• coordination;
• applicable charges.

We will compare the total with prices actually available during the same period, including special offers.

We will account separately for buyers' time and service conditions.

We are interested in three results:

1. Did the buyer pay less?
2. Are the terms acceptable to the producer?
3. Can the chain operate without ongoing unpaid help?

There is also a separate research question: does using ObliNet mechanisms provide additional benefit compared with the usual organisation of a joint purchase? To answer this, we need, as far as possible, to compare coordination costs, the time spent reaching agreements, errors, changes in terms and fulfilment of commitments. Without comparable data, a single successfully completed order does not demonstrate an advantage for ObliNet.

ObliNet is an initiative to create an open network of needs, capabilities and agreed commitments.

A separate software prototype, Reference Kernel / Workbench, has been developed as part of the ObliNet research. In synthetic scenarios it checks the compatibility of formalised constraints relating to time, resources and dependencies, and allows changes to be modelled and coordinated. It is not a complete joint purchasing system: group order creation, settlements with participants and goods distribution require separate development and testing.

Specific savings figures for such a chain require calculations for the selected products and purchasing terms.

So our public request is simple:

support the test → provide actual offers → fulfil an order → publish the results.

If the trial is successful, repeat and expand it.

If it is not, show exactly where the figures failed to add up.

We invite buyers, farmers, businesses, carriers and community organisers. Tell us what you are willing to buy, supply or do, in what volume and on what terms.

The first result will be a completed order with clear economics, rather than the number of supporters.